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alleviate fears that this exception might 
be abused by pointing out that: (1) if 
properly applied by the courts, this ex-
ception prohibits action by those persons 
deriving an indirect benefit from the trans-
action; and (2) the Code of Professional 
Responsibility requires an attorney to 
zealously represent his clients within the 
bounds of the law and to refrain from 
representing clients with conflicting in-
terests. Id. at 131, 492 A.2d at 626. 
- Marc Minkove 
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel: ATTORNEY ADVERTISING 
In Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel, 105 S.Ct. 2265 (1985), the United 
States Supreme Court continued to de-
lineate the path between an attorney's 
constitutional right to advertise and the 
valid police power of the state in regulat-
ing the conduct oflawyers. The plurality 
opinion secures the attorney's first amend-
ment right to solicit business through 
nondeceptive printed advertisements, yet 
maintains the state's authority to compel 
disclosure of information so that the ads 
are not deceptive. 
The Zauderer case involved an Ohio at-
torney who placed advertisements in 
thirty-six newspapers within the state to 
publicize his willingness to represent 
women who had suffered injuries from 
the use of the Dalkon Shield Intrauterine 
Device. The ad featured a line-drawn il-
lustration of the contraceptive, and in-
cluded the following textual information: 
The Dalkon Shield Interuterine (sic) 
Device is alleged to have caused seri-
ous pelvic infections resulting in hos-
pitalizations, tubal damage, infertil-
ity, and hysterectomies. It is also 
alleged to have caused unplanned 
pregnancies ending in abortions, mis-
carriages, septic abortions, tubal or 
ectopic pregnancies, and full-term de-
liveries. If you or a friend have had a 
similar experience do not assume it is 
too late to take legal action against the 
Shield's manufacturer. Our law firm 
is presently representing women on 
such cases. The cases are handled on 
a contingent fee basis of the amount 
recovered. If there is no recovery, no 
legal fees are owed by the clients. 
Zauderer, 105 S.Ct. at 227l. 
The attorney received numerous responses 
to the ads, and initiated suit for over one 
hundred clients. 
The Office of Disciplinary Counsel 
filed a complaint against Zauderer claim-
ing that the advertisement violated several 
of the state's disciplinary rules. The Su-
preme Court of Ohio found that Zauderer 
violated the disciplinary rules by his fail-
ure to disclose the clients potentialliabil-
ity for costs, by using an illustration in 
the advertisement, and because the ad 
constituted an impermissible self-recom-
mendation. The Ohio court found this 
conduct warranted a public reprimand. 
Zauderer filed his appeal to the Su-
preme Court of the United States, con-
tending that Ohio's disciplinary rules vio-
lated the first amendment by authorizing 
the state to discipline him for the content 
of the Dalkon Shield ad. 
While most states have adopted a code 
of professional responsibility which regu-
lates the conduct of attorneys, the Su-
preme Court has recognized several con-
stitutional problems with these general 
rules. The Supreme Court has recognized 
that an attorney has a constitutional right 
to advertise, and found that state regula-
HARBOR PRINTING 
Xerox Center 
3 East Redwood Street 
Baltimore, Maryland 21202 
576-8656 
THE VERY BEST IN 
XEROX AND OFFSET PRINTING 
WE SPECIALIZE IN 
APPELLATE BRIEFS & RECORDS 
RESUMES 
XEROX COPYING 
24 HOUR SERVICE 
tions which provide blanket bans on ad-
vertising prices for routine legal services 
violated the first amendment. Bates v. 
State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977). 
The Supreme Court has also found that 
rules prohibiting attorneys from using 
nondeceptive terminology to describe their 
fields of practice were an unconstitutional 
infringement on an attorney's first amend-
ment rights. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 
(1978). Yet, the Supreme Court has al-
lowed state regulations which prohibit in-
person solicitation of clients, in certain 
circumstances. Ohralik v. State Bar Assn., 
436 U.S. 447 (1978). 
It is against this background that Zau-
derer challenged the constitutionality of 
Ohio's disciplinary rules prohibiting the 
solicitation of legal business through 
printed advertisements containing advice 
and information regarding specific legal 
problems. He also challenged Ohio's re-
strictions on the use of illustrations, and 
the state's disclosure requirements relat-
ing to contingent fees. 
The Supreme Court found that while 
the state could prohibit advertising that is 
inherently misleading, they could not use 
this reasoning to justify disciplining an at-
torney for running nondeceptive adver-
tisements geared to persons with specific 
legal rights. The Court noted that Zau-
derer's ads did not provide deceptive or 
misleading information about Dalkon 
Shields, and, in fact, were totally accu-
rate. Zauderer, 105 S.Ct. at 2276-77. The 
Supreme Court also noted an important 
distinction between in-person solicitation 
and printed advertising. While "in-person 
solicitation was a practice ripe with possi-
bilities for overreaching, invasion of pri-
vacy, the exercise of undue influence, 
and outright fraud," Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 
464-65, printed advertising is a "means of 
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conveying information about legal services 
that is more conducive to reflection and 
the exercise of choice on the part of the 
consumer." Zauderer, 105 S.Ct. at 2277. 
Ohio argued that a prophylactic rule 
was needed to prohibit attorneys from 
using legal advice in false or misleading 
advertisements. However, the Supreme 
Court found that the prophylactic ban 
was not the least restrictive way to secure 
the state's interests in preventing public 
deception. The Supreme Court noted that 
the Federal Trade Commission carries out 
a similar mission in eliminating unfair or 
deceptive advertisements in commerce, and 
found that distinguishing deceptive from 
nondeceptive -legal-advertisements would 
be no more difficult. Id. at 2278-80. The 
Court concluded that an attorney--lPay not 
be disciplined for soliciting legal business 
through printed advertising containing 
truthful and nondeceptive information 
and advice regarding the legal rights of 
others. 
Similarly, the Supreme Court struck 
down Ohio's restrictions on the use of il-
lustrations in attorney advertisements. 
The Court noted that "the use of illustra-
tions or pictures in advertisements serves 
important communicative functions: it at-
tracts the attention of the audience to 
the advertiser's message, and it may also 
serve to impart information directly." Id. 
at 2280. Since commercial illustrations 
are entitled to the first amendment pro-
tection of verbal commercial speech, the 
state had the burden of showing a sub-
stantial government interest justifying the 
restriction. The Court found that the 
state's interest that attorneys maintain 
dignity did not justify the abridgement of 
their first amendment rights. Further-
more, since advertising could be policed 
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on a case-by-case basis, the prophylactic 
ban on all illustrations in printed attorney 
advertisements was unconstitutional. 
Zauderer finally challenged the state's 
disclosure requirements in contingent fee 
advertisements. Under the Ohio disci-
plinary rules, an attorney must state that 
the client may have to bear certain ex-
penses even if he loses. Zauderer felt this 
compulsion violated his first amendment 
rights. The Supreme Court found that 
since commercial speech was principally 
justified by its value to consumers, Zau-
derer's protected interest in not providing 
factual information in his advertising was 
minimal, and his interest was adequately 
protected by the requirement that the dis-
closures be reasonably related to the 
state's interest in preventing deception of 
consumers. The Court then found that 
the Ohio requirement of disclosure in 
contingent fee ads was rationally related 
to the state's goals. The Court noted that 
a layman may not be aware of the distinc-
tion between "legal fees" and "costs," and 
may wrongfully feel that he will entail 
no expenses. The Court concluded that 
Ohio's ruling was reasonable enough to 
support a requirement of disclosure, and 
did not violate the first amendment. 
The Supreme Court's opinion in Zau-
derer protects an attorney's first amend-
ment right to advertise, yet recognizes the 
state's interest in protecting the public 
from deception. While the state may no 
longer issue blanket bans to prevent an at-
torney from offering legal advice or using 
illustrations in printed advertisements, 
the state may evaluate these ads on a case-
by-case basis in order to ensure that the 
ads are not deceptive. The state may also 
compel the disclosure of specific informa-
tion to prevent an ad from being decep-
tive. As attorneys begin to exercise their 
constitutional rights, they should be aware 
of the potential of the state to create an 
advertising review board, and should en-
deavor to prevent deceptive printed ad-
vertisements from entering into the mar-
ketplace of ideas. 
- Lawrence M. Meister 
Virgil v. "Kash N'Karry": 
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 
SUFFICIENT IN PRODUCTS 
LIABILITY 
In a case of first impression, the Court 
of Special Appeals of Maryland has ruled 
that circumstantial evidence, in a prod-
ucts liability action, is sufficient to estab-
lish the existence of a defect, thereby en-
abling the case to survive motions for a 
directed verdict and reach the jury. In 
Virgil v. "Kash N'Karry" Service Corpora-
tion, 61 Md. App. 23, 484 A.2d 652 (1984), 
the court reversed in part a directed ver-
dict, at the close of the claimant's case, en-
tered by the Circuit Court for Howard 
County Guy J. Cicone, J. in favor of the 
defendant manufacturer, Aladdin Indus-
tries, Incorporated and seller, "Kash 
N'Karry" Service Corporation. The court 
reversed the trial court with respect to the 
implied warranty of merchantability and 
strict liability in tort counts. The counts 
sounding in negligence, including failure 
to warn, were affirmed by the court. 
The factual circumstances of the case 
involved the implosion of a pint-size 
thermos purchased at "Kash N'Karry" 
two or three months prior to the accident. 
Testimony by the plaintiff, Irma Virgil, 
revealed that the thermos was filled with 
coffee and a small amount of milk every 
weekday morning. The thermos was then 
carried to work, either by its handle or in 
a bag containing her shoes. On Saturdays, 
the thermos was carried downstairs to her 
den, where the plaintiff spent the day 
studying. 
Mrs. Virgil cleaned the thermos by fill-
ing it at night with a solution of baking 
soda and warm water. In the morning, 
she would wash the thermos with a bottle 
brush. The label bore the words, "Easy to 
Keep Clean," but there were no instruc-
tions on how to clean the thermos or what 
constituted a normal manner of cleansing 
the thermos. One Saturday morning the 
thermos imploded, causing the hot coffee 
and glass to be spewn into the face and 
eye of Mrs. Virgil. Mrs. Virgil testified 
that she did not drop, misuse, abuse, or 
damage the thermos in any way, but the 
plaintiff failed to present any expert "to 
give any scientific explanation for the im-
plosion." !d. at 27, 484 A.2d at 654. 
